Anthony J. Mastalir led the effort to establish U.S. Space Force as a key component of the Pentagon’s geographic combatant commands, starting with the high-priority Middle East and Indo-Pacific. Now, Maj. Gen. Mastalir has been assigned as the director of global space operations (J3) for U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM).
Mastalir sat down with Apogee to talk about working with allies and partners in space before he moved on from his position in July 2025 as the first commander of U.S. Space Forces-Indo-Pacific (SFI), a component of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM). He explained the Space Force’s efforts to integrate space power into all aspects of joint operations and multinational exercises and the importance of working with other nations at a time when “our security is increasingly interdependent.”
Among the steps forward taken by SFI under Mastalir’s command were the establishment of subordinate commands in Korea in 2022 and Japan in 2024, and the deepening of relationships and coordination with allies and partners throughout the region.
Are space capabilities playing a greater role in exercises like Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) and Cobra Gold now that the U.S. Department of Defense has stood up Space Forces-Indo-Pacific?
- Increased Integration: Absolutely. With the establishment of SFI, we’re seeing a deliberate and increasing integration of space effects into major exercises like RIMPAC, Cobra Gold, Talisman Sabre, Keen Edge and Valiant Shield.
- Showcasing Interoperability: These exercises underscore the interoperability and readiness of a robust alliance structure, demonstrating the power of a unified coalition operating across domains.
- Developing Mission Sets: SFI is a new organization with developing mission sets, requirements and training, and these exercises are crucial for refining our capabilities and preparing for conflict.
What support can our allies offer when it comes to the space capabilities needed in the Indo-Pacific to ensure U.S. goals of a free and open region, promoting peace and security, and deterring aggression?
- Force multipliers: Our international partners and allies are absolutely critical to increasing our warfighting capacity, countering adversary threats and enhancing regional security. They act as force multipliers.
- Integrated capabilities: We are working to integrate allied and partner space capabilities, leveraging their unique strengths and expertise.
- Security cooperation: Our Campaign Support Plan provides a road map for robust space security and posture initiatives that aligns with USINDOPACOM priorities.
Are steps being taken to integrate space capabilities among allies in the Indo-Pacific as they are with our other tools of warfighting? Is education and training in space systems part of this integration?
- Aligning with USINDOPACOM scheme of maneuver: We are developing our own plans and CONOPS [concepts of operation] aligned to USINDOPACOM’s overall scheme of maneuver, ensuring that space power is seamlessly integrated into joint operations.
- Joint training initiatives: We have been actively working to integrate allies into our operations, exercises and training. A recent success was sponsoring NSSI [National Security Space Institute] mobile training teams for joint space training with Australia, New Zealand, Japan and the Republic of Korea.
- Leading space security cooperation: SFI is now responsible for leading on space security cooperation within the Indo-Pacific region. This includes building out and negotiating space posture initiatives in allied and partner territories. We are focused on expanding space expertise among our allies through training and knowledge sharing.
- Developing Guardians: Our training program develops Guardians for roles as Joint Planners Command and Control, Space Electromagnetic Warfare (EW), Intel Support and Warfighter integration.
What can Space Force learn and what new skills can Guardians develop by working closely with our international partners?
- Diverse perspectives: Working with international partners provides Guardians with diverse perspectives on space operations, challenges and solutions.
- Interoperability and best practices: Collaboration fosters interoperability and allows us to learn from each other’s best practices.
- Strengthened relationships: These interactions build strong relationships and trust, which are essential for cooperation in a crisis.
Will there be a point when our partners play a role in the design of space strategy and tactics rather than as forces to be integrated within ours?
- Evolving partnership: We envision a future where our partners play an increasingly active role in shaping space strategy and tactics in their regions, moving beyond simply being integrated forces.
- Collaborative approach: This will require a collaborative approach to planning and development, leveraging the unique experience of each nation.
Can you describe some of the space-specific operations employed in multinational exercises?
- Normalizing space power: The establishment of SFI and the publication of our first CSP [campaign support plan] are key steps in “normalizing space power” — integrating it seamlessly into all aspects of joint operations and multinational exercises.
- Integrating space effects: Our multinational exercises are increasingly focused on integrating space effects with those of our allies. This includes demonstrating and practicing the use of space-based ISR, SATCOM and PNT [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; satellite communications; and position, navigation and timing] to enhance situational awareness, improve communication and enable precision targeting across all domains.
- Synchronizing space EW fires: We are actively working with allies to synchronize terrestrial space EW planning, disrupting adversary kill chains and protecting our forces in the electromagnetic spectrum. Exercises like Talisman Sabre provide opportunities to practice these critical coordination efforts and identify gaps in our capabilities.
- Joint/combined planning and coordination: A key focus is on joint planning and coordination of space operations with our partners. This involves sharing information, developing common operating procedures and conducting combined rhythms that allow for maximum integration and synchronization.
- Addressing challenges: These exercises help us identify and address challenges related to interoperability, classification and data sharing, and command and control in a multinational environment.
Why is it important for Guardians to forge stronger relationships with allies and partners?
- Collective security and interdependence: Strong relations with allies and partners are absolutely essential for collective security and deterring aggression in the Indo-Pacific. Our security is increasingly interdependent.
- Shared understanding and norms: Collaboration fosters a shared understanding of the evolving threat landscape, particularly concerning adversaries’ counterspace capabilities, and allows us to convey norms of freedom of space navigation.
- Leveraging diverse expertise: Allies and partners bring unique perspectives, capabilities and regional knowledge that enhance our own operational effectiveness across all domains.
- Addressing friction points: We recognize there are challenges to seamless integration — SCIF [sensitive compartmented information facility] access, read-ins, IT system access — and are actively working to address these friction points to improve data sharing and interoperability.
How have China’s counterspace capabilities developed in recent years and what challenge do they pose in the Indo-Pacific region for the U.S. and its allies? Are USINDOPACOM and U.S. allies adjusting their training to account for China’s expansion in space and its more aggressive military exercises in the South China Sea?
- The “kill web” threat: China has developed a space-enabled reconnaissance-strike complex — a “kill web” — capable of targeting U.S. and allied forces across vast distances with alarming speed and precision. This isn’t hypothetical; it’s operational and central to China’s strategy.
- Integrated system: This kill web connects space-based sensors, terrestrial command systems and long-range fires in a theater-wide architecture designed to hold our forces at risk before they can even enter the fight.
Examples of Counterspace Capabilities:
- Direct-ascent anti-satellite weapons: Demonstrated in 2007 by destroying one of its own defunct weather satellites, showcasing the ability to destroy satellites in low Earth orbit.
- Rendezvous and proximity operations: Utilizing satellites like SJ-21 to demonstrate on-orbit servicing, assembly and manufacturing capabilities, but also potentially for inspection, disruption or disabling of other satellites.
- Cyber and electronic warfare: Employing jamming and spoofing techniques to disrupt satellite communications and navigation.
- Co-orbital weapons: Developing capabilities to maneuver satellites closer to others for potential interference or attack.
- Hypersonic weapons: Developing hypersonic glide vehicles capable of rapidly striking targets, potentially utilizing space-based targeting and guidance.
How might these Chinese exercises foretell the launch of an invasion of Taiwan?
- Monitoring and analysis: We are closely monitoring China’s military exercises and analyzing their implications for regional security, including potential scenarios involving Taiwan.
- Deterrence and preparedness: Our focus remains on deterring aggression and ensuring we are prepared to respond to any contingency.