APOGEE STAFF
Before its tanks rolled across Ukraine’s borders in February 2022, Russian forces hacked a commercial satellite to disable communications. That opening salvo against United States-based Viasat Inc. sent a clear message to the U.S. and NATO regarding future conflicts: Space is a warfighting domain.
Of course, Russia isn’t alone in recognizing the strategic value of U.S. military and commercial satellites. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) — described as a “pacing threat” by U.S. military leaders — also appreciates “the criticality of the space domain and the U.S. military’s increasing reliance on space,” said retired Space Force Col. Charles S. Galbreath, senior resident fellow for space studies at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies.
His policy paper, “Building U.S. Space Force Counterspace Capabilities: An Imperative for America’s Defense,” published by the institute in June 2023, explores the U.S. military’s dependence on satellites, why future conflicts will inevitably involve space assets, and how the U.S. needs to bolster its space-based capabilities to counter its adversaries.
The PRC understands this more than anybody. “The People’s Republic of China now believes attacking U.S. space systems is essential to prevailing in a conflict with the United States and is actively fielding the most extensive collection of counterspace threats of any nation,” Galbreath wrote.
The debate over space weapons dates back to the 1980s, when the U.S. pursued the Strategic Defense Initiative, or “Star Wars” program, to defend against potential Soviet missile strikes. The program was canceled so the U.S. wouldn’t be perceived as “a first mover” in the development of space weapons that could disrupt the status quo. That mindset prevailed for decades and didn’t go unnoticed. Seeing value in space weapons, U.S. adversaries invested heavily in research and development so that by the 2000s, a range of threats had emerged — direct-ascent missiles, jammers, lasers, high-powered microwaves (HPM) and co-orbital systems designed to pull satellites off course.
“In contrast, the U.S. space architecture was tailored to maximize the benefit of space as a peaceful domain — leaving it virtually defenseless and making it vulnerable to Russian and Chinese attacks,” wrote Galbreath, who served as the Space Force’s deputy chief of technology and innovation officer. “The disconnect between these two approaches now drives the Space Force to rapidly adjust to the reality of space as a warfighting domain and address the threats posed by Russia and China.”
Within the Space Force is a unit created to do just that: Space Delta 7, the force’s operational intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) arm. Its mission is to “execute global ISR operations to gain and maintain information dominance in the space domain.” Much of the heavy lifting in Delta 7 falls to the 75th Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Squadron (ISRS) — the Space Force’s first targeting squadron. Created in August 2023 at Peterson Space Force Base, Colorado, the 75th, with its Grim Reaper arm patch, was created to identify space threats and present possible counterspace options to the joint force.
“The goal with the 75th is also part of normalizing as a service, with a warfighting domain,” Lt. Gen. DeAnna Burt, the Space Force’s deputy chief of space operations for operations, cyber and nuclear, explained at a Mitchell Institute event in January 2024. “Every service has targeting squadrons or targeting elements that focus on targets within their domain.
“The 75th is building all sorts of targeting folders across the space architecture that would include the capability, from an all-domain perspective, to take down an enemy’s capabilities,” she said. “There are standard target folders, and they’re digital, that include various things that allow you to look at where best to strike and with what types of munitions and what probability of a kill.
“By no means do we want to see war extend into space, but if it does, we have to be prepared to fight and win,” Burt said. Those targeting folders include adversaries’ satellites; their related architecture, such as ground stations and mobile units; and the electromagnetic signals between them. In a sense, the 75th puts the force in Space Force.
Force Base in Colorado, are the service’s first offensive weapon. AIRMAN 1ST CLASS ANDREW BERTAIN/U.S. AIR FORCE
However, assessing threats — understanding a satellite’s purpose and potential weaponry — can sometimes be tricky, such as in January 2022, when the PRC fielded a satellite with a robotic arm, or grappler. The spacecraft, called Shijian-21, latched onto a defunct CompassG2, or Beidou, navigation satellite and tugged it out of geosynchronous orbit toward a “graveyard orbit” for dead spacecraft.
The incident, noted by space monitoring company COMSPOC Corp. and later by news outlets, poses a challenge to U.S. forces; while the PRC can claim Shijian-21 is a debris-removal tool, it can easily serve a military purpose as well by shifting U.S. satellites out of orbit.
Shijian-21 is just one among an array of operational weapons fielded by the PRC, according to “Competing in Space,” published in December 2023 by the National Space Intelligence Center and the National Air and Space Intelligence Center. Others include HPMs, lasers, ground-launched kinetic weapons, cyber capabilities to penetrate satellite architectures and a host of ground-based electronic warfare (EW) systems.
“China and Russia view the U.S. as overly reliant upon space for military and information superiority,” the 25-page report said. “Seeking asymmetric advantages in future conflict, both countries are designing, testing, and demonstrating counterspace weapons to deny, disrupt, or destroy satellites and space services. They often mask or conceal these activities to avoid international condemnation.”
Galbreath calls the extent and pace of the PRC’s buildup of space weapons alarming. What worries him more, however, is whether the U.S. is taking the threat seriously enough. “We all know China and Russia have space weapons. That’s not a debatable question. It’s a fact. Will they use them? I think so,” he told Apogee. “My biggest fear is that the United States is going to be slow to respond to the reality that space is a warfighting domain and not take seriously the steps that we have to take in order to counter those systems.”
The U.S. has taken some steps to resist attacks, including the continuing deployment of spacecraft hardened against radiation as well as smaller, difficult-to-target satellites that will eventually constitute new communications and ISR constellations. All of this — along with greater space domain awareness, thanks to Delta 7 — helps to strengthen U.S. satellite defenses. The U.S. also is bolstering its cyber and electronic warfare capabilities and building partnerships with other spacefaring nations.
“The work we’ve been doing with our allies also increases our resilience posture and therefore our deterrent messaging, because you may take out a U.S. satellite, but we’ve got a bunch of allied capabilities and commercial capabilities that we can leverage as well,” Galbreath said. “If you’re taking on the United States in a conflict, you’ve got to recognize that if you’re China or Russia, that you’re not just taking on the United States, you’re taking on a good portion of the entire world.”
Together, the Space Force and Air National Guard operate 16 transportable CCS units. L3 HARRIS
However, he said, the U.S. must also invest in space-based offensive capabilities given the array of weapons already in the hands of the PRC and Russia, including ground-based missiles, lasers that can “dazzle” satellites’ optics and HPMs that emit devastating electromagnetic pulse shock waves.
The volume and sophistication of these weapons should be worrying, he said, but more of a concern is the possibility the U.S. might not be doing enough to protect its satellite networks. “That’s what keeps me up at night, that we’re not moving fast enough” to develop counterspace systems, he said.
There might be signs the Space Force is moving in that direction. In testimony before the U.S. Senate Appropriations Defense Subcommittee on April 18, 2023, Space Force Chief of Space Operations Gen. B. Chance Saltzman alluded to possible offensive capabilities, telling senators that “full spectrum operations” might be available by 2026.
“I’m happy to say that I expect that by the end of my tenure, if I make it all the way to ’26, that you’re going to see a substantial on-orbit capability that allows us to compete in full-spectrum operations,” Saltzman said in response to Sen. Jon Tester, who asked about prior-year funding to the Space Force. “I’m not sure I could have said that two years ago. But the fact that we’ve accelerated the programs, and we’ve built a program that delivers in capability in terms of three, four and five years, I’m very comfortable that we have a program in place that will do just that.”
Saltzman didn’t elaborate on what capability the Space Force is creating. Galbreath said it’s likely the force is considering systems that support “responsible counterspace campaign plans” that won’t contribute space debris. He isn’t sure what that resulting arsenal would look like, but it might include lasers, jammers, increased cyber technologies and guided munitions to take out ground stations.
The work we’ve been doing with our allies also increases our resilience posture and therefore our deterrent messaging, because you may take out a U.S. satellite, but we’ve got a bunch of allied capabilities and commercial capabilities that we can leverage as well.” ~ Col. Galbreath
Whatever path the Pentagon ultimately chooses, he said he hopes it’s a multifaceted one that combines robust offensive and defensive capabilities. “The objective is to convince [the PRC’s] military that they cannot succeed, to deter them long enough for diplomatic and other elements of national power to win the day, actually, and achieve some other off-ramp in a crisis situation that averts conflict and maintains the peace,” Galbreath said. “That’s the goal, and I think a defensive [posture] alone isn’t enough to do that. You need a combination.”
The Space Force might soon add to its offensive capabilities. In 2025, the force is scheduled to take delivery on the first of 16 mobile jammers known as Counter Communication System (CCS) Block 10.2, developed by L3Harris. The powerful, trailer-mounted devices, equipped with radar dishes to disrupt enemy satellite signals, will be the Space Force’s first offensive weapon system.
CCS was introduced in 2004 and a Block 10.1 upgrade was fielded in 2014. “CCS has had incremental upgrades since the early 2000s, which have incorporated new techniques, frequency bands, technology refreshes and lessons learned from previous block upgrades,” Space Force Maj. Seth Horner, CCS B10.2 program manager, said in a news release in 2020. “This specific upgrade includes new software capabilities to counter new adversary targets and threats.”
Also, Space Force Guardians have held ongoing exercises during the past three years to enhance their EW skills. One previous Black Skies segment — organized by the Space Training and Readiness Command and held in September 2023 — included a live simulated exercise and focused on the integration of EW units. More than 170 EW specialists participated.
“Electronic warfare is an integral piece to the joint environment,” said U.S. Space Force Col. Scott Nakatani, 392d Combat Training Squadron commander. “It is inevitable that the U.S. Space Force should continue to integrate, communicate and coordinate with other services in the EW environment to ensure combat capability of our forces in a contested, degraded and operationally limited environment.”
In his policy paper, Galbreath said, “Norms of responsible behavior, improved resilience, and expanded space domain awareness are all vital elements of a comprehensive strategy but by themselves will not achieve all U.S. national security objectives. To credibly deter and, if necessary, defeat an adversary like China, the Space Force must have a robust suite of counterspace capabilities to protect national interests in space and defend fielded forces from an adversary’s space-enabled attacks.”